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“Very nice, the enemies are gone!” – Coming to 
Terms With GDR Sports Since 1989/90 
Jutta Braun * 
Abstract: When the SED regime collapsed, the lustre of 
East Germany’s gold medals still impressed the world and 
especially West German sports politicians. The road to the 
merger of the two sport systems represented a special case 
of German reunification, as in sports the West pined for 
learning from the East. But soon the dark sides of GDR 
sport became visible. The Ministry of State Security spied 
on the sportsmen and women, invaded their privacy and 
even recruited them as “unofficial collaborators”. The ath-
letes had little or no chance to escape the doping pro-
gramme forced on them by the state. Many sportsmen and 
women are still suffering from the long-term damage 
caused by this pharmacological abuse. Until today, attitudes 
towards GDR sport are ambiguous: while on the one hand 
regarded as repressive and unethical, it is on the other hand 
praised as a highly suitable institutional model for the fu-
ture.  
 
“Do Communists run faster?”1 a West German sports publicist provocatively 
asked in 1968. Since the Olympic Games at Mexico City the same year – the 
first that saw the performance of a seperate East German team – the small East 
German state succeeded in gaining more medals than its West German coun-
terpart. “While failing politically in most sectors of economy and society, when 
it came to sports East Germany was on top of the world.”2  
This stunning success story led to some exceptional circumstances when the 
challenge of German unification was imminent in 1989/90. With most parts of 
the SED-dictatorship being morally and economically discredited, East German 
people voted in their first free election on March 18th 1990 for a fast reunion 
with the West, implicating the take over of the West German constitution as 
                                                             
*  Address all communications to: Jutta Braun, Universität Potsdam, Am Neuen Palais 10, 
14469 Potsdam, Germany; e-mail: jbraun@uni-potsdam.de. 
1  Knecht, (1969, p. 1). 
2  Möller (2004, p. 311). 
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well as the Western life style. Such, the so called “Aufbau Ost” was clearly 
destined to become a “Nachbau West”.3 But regarding sports, the picture was 
wholly different: When the SED-regime tumbled down, the glamour of its gold 
medals was still shining on. Especially West German sports politicians and 
officials were deeply impressed by the East German “Sportwunder”. The Min-
ister of Sports Wolfgang Schäuble postulated in March 1990 to preserve the 
“achievements” of GDR sports, the president of the German national sports 
organization, the “Deutscher Sportbund” (DSB), Hans Hansen, fully agreed.4 
The collapse of the GDR and its sports structures proved to be a lucky opportu-
nity for many of West Germany’s professional clubs. Shortly after the fall of 
the wall East German sport stars in droves were crossing the inter German 
Rubicon and hired at West German clubs, encouraged by managers from the 
West, who, in acts of mere “sports piracy”, bought in complete East German 
national teams.5 After reunification, when the first joint Olympic team since 
1964 was sent to the games of Albertville and Barcelona in 1992, East German 
athletes significantly contributed to an overwhelming success. At Albertville, 
for the first time ever since, the Federal Republic of Germany was catapulted 
into the top position of the Olympic ranking order.6 This triumph was ac-
counted for as a “leistungssportlicher Vereinigungsgewinn”7. But not only the 
East German sportsmen and sportswomen were seen as a great potential for the 
united sports nation. Above all, West German sports leaders hoped to finally 
get an inside view of the up to then carefully hidden “secrets” of East German 
competitive sports, especially concerning training programmes and medical 
expertise.8 In view of this unusual constellation – the West pining for learning 
from the East – it shall be asked today, 17 years after unification, what are the 
outliving elements and images of the highly praised GDR sports systems. 
Even if one would not subscribe to the view that GDR sports still “is alive”,9 
the controversies on its meaning and effects surely are of vivid character. Con-
flicting interpretations have dominated the debates during the period of “the 
most recent contemporary history”.10 While GDR sports is on the one hand 
lauded for being a suitable institutional model for the future, other voices are 
                                                             
3  That means the structures of the West simply should be reproduced. Land; Willisch (2005). 
4  “Schäuble will Erfolg des DDR-Sports retten”. FAZ, 22.3.1990; “Gemeinsamer Fahrplan 
DTSB/DSB”. Neues Deutschland, 6.4.1990. 
5  This was true for handball and cycling. See Braun (2006, p. 355). 
6  At the Olympic Games in Calgary in 1988 the FRG had only reached the 8th place. (Kluge, 
2004, p. 222). 
7  That means a success in competitive sports due to german unification. Knecht (2003, 
p. 242). 
8  To the question of secrecy surrounding the GDR competitive sports see the article of René 
Wiese in this issue. 
9  Erbach (2006). 
10  Schwarz calls the historical period from 1989/90 up to the present as the “most recent 
contemporary history”. Schwarz (2003, pp. 5-28). 
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emphasizing the dark sides of this sports system which ruthlessly inflicted 
mental and physical damage on its athletes.11 
Imitating the East – Institutional transfer in sports 
The spread of nostalgia among East Germans during the 1990s, generally re-
ferred to as “Ostalgia”, last but not least revived the images of the East German 
sport stars, with Katarina Witt embodying the most unforgettable icon.12  
This attitude was often looked down upon by West Germans as a sentimen-
tal and irrational attitude. But long before East Germans rediscovered their 
past, West German sports officials had already behaved very “ostalgical” in the 
summer of 1990: The Unification treaty between the two Germanys, laid down 
in August 1990, fixed the continuance of certain scientific institutions the West 
regarded as being responsible for the enormous Olympic success of the now 
dying GDR: among them were the “Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur” 
(FKS) at Leipzig as well as the “Doping-Control-Laboratory” at Kreischa near 
Dresden.13 This paragraph at once was harshly criticized by members of the 
East German civil rights movement, as there were already rumours and sub-
stantial hints on the doping activities of these institutions.14 Looking back two 
years later, members of the Ministry of the Interior (responsible for sports) and 
the DSB mutually blamed each other for holding the responsibility for this 
overhasty step.15  
The controversial preservation of the two institutions of “secret sports re-
search” can only be explained if one takes into account the inferiority complex 
of West German sports since the end of the 1960s, its impression of “falling far 
behind its Eastern neighbour”.16 Not only training methods, but also the han-
dling of sports medicine was regarded as unprogressive. While pharmacologi-
cal manipulation was never openly discussed in the GDR, West Germany ex-
perienced an intense debate following the Olympic Games of 1968: “Are we 
raising monsters?” the discus thrower Brigitte Berendonk publicly asked after 
her shattering experiences at Mexiko-City, pointing out the wide-spread medi-
                                                             
11  Krebs (2000, p. 172). 
12  Katarina Witt co-hosted the popular “GDR-Show”, aired in the autumn of 2003 by RTL 
network. 
13  It also included the “Forschungs- und Entwicklungsstelle für Sportgeräte” (FES) at East-
Berlin. See Einigungsvertrag, Kapitel VII, Artikel 39, in: von Münch, Ingo, Die Verträge 
zur Einheit Deutschlands, München 1990, p. 65f. 
14  Experts of the FKS like Prof. Buhl had openly admitted that they had been the persons 
who decided if and when a drug had to be applied. “Doping aus Fürsorge”. Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 15.2.1990. 
15  “In der Medaillenforschung ist die Vergangenheit unvollkommen bewältigt”. FAZ, 
14.3.1992. 
16  Knecht (1975, p. 1132). 
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cal manipulation in international sports.17 Prior to the Olympic Games at  
Munich in 1972, the West German coach Hans Jörg Kofink warned that the 
expected performances could only be enhanced by drug usage and that such a 
custom could not be regarded as ethical.18 On the contrary, politicians like 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the then-head of the German parliamentary committee for 
sports, explicitly appreciated pharmacological “support” as a serious option.19 
In the course of this public debate, the Cold War and especially the inter Ger-
man rivalry was used as an argumentative weapon pro-doping. The West thor-
oughly noticed that in the aftermath of Montreal 1976 – with the sensational 
success of (visibly doped) East German swimmers – a lot of sports doctors of 
the FKS were awarded prestigious national prizes. “Equality of opportunity with 
the East” was the slogan the proponents of doping were using to convince their 
opponents. 20 
Anyway there was an overwhelming interest in learning scientific news 
from the East. Because of this, the star of a congress of sports doctors held in 
Freiburg i. Breisgau in 1976 was a sports doctor who had fled from 
Halle/Saale: Dr. Alois Mader was holding the “most attended lecture with the 
shortest title: Anabolica – while the auditorium was crowded with sports doc-
tors, officials and coaches – expectantly holding pencils and sheets of paper in 
their hands.”21 The sympathy towards the achievements of the sports medicine 
of the GDR was so strong, that even the obvious negative symptoms were 
dismissed as irrelevant: “In the East women do get along with male voices 
without problems – because in the GDR there is social security,”22 the West 
German sports doctor Dr. Wilfried Kindermann explained. For the East Ger-
man sports leadership it was of course a living nightmare that an East German 
doctor was encouraging the class enemy to follow the own path of success – 
consequently the Ministry of State Security (MfS) was given the task of defam-
ing Dr. Mader and isolating him socially.23 In the following years different 
doctors and coaches from the GDR escaped to the West and had a strong influ-
ence on the doping scene of the FRG .24 During the whole period of the Cold 
War, the FKS at Leipzig seemed to Western experts as a “mystical miracle”, 
far out of their reach.25 
                                                             
17  “Züchten wir Monstren?” Die Zeit, 5.12.1969. 
18  Singer; Treutlein (2006, p. 62). 
19  Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographisches Protokoll über die Anhörung von Sachverständigen 
in der 6. Sitzung des Sportausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 28. September 1977, Bonn 1977, 
p. 101f.  
20  Knecht (1976, pp. 1175ff.). Reaching “equality with the West” is the very argument the 
protagonists of GDR Sports are using to justify their former doping practices. Erbach 
(2006). 
21  “Auf der Suche nach der Menschlichkeit im Sport sichtlich überfordert”. FAZ, 26.10.1976. 
22  Ibid.  
23   BStU, ZA, MfS 10165/79, 272. 
24   Singer; Treutlein (2006, p. 153; p. 285f.). 
25  “Bisher war hier kein Fremder”. Der Spiegel, 22.1.1990. 
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Given this fascination, it was no surprise that West German sports politi-
cians sought for the preservation of FKS and Kreischa in the united Germany. 
But shortly after the Unification Treaty was signed, new disclosures about the 
doping practice of the GDR led to a public scandal. Instead of preventing drug 
usage, Kreischa conducted tests that had to make sure that all traces of doping 
had vanished at the moment the athletes were travelling to international compe-
titions.26 „We didn’t want to get a washing machine for athletes pumped up 
with drugs”, Hans Hansen had to defend himself a few days before unification 
on December 1990.27  
As if this was not trouble enough, the staff of FKS and Kreischa was soon 
accused of being closely entangled with the Ministry of State Security. Not 
earlier than now West German politicians slowly realized that political repres-
sion had been a considerable fact of life within the GDR sports apparatus. In 
1991 the FKS was incorporated into a newly founded “Institut für Angewandte 
Trainingswissenschaft” (IAT). But meanwhile this was seen as a politically 
delicate procedure – the foundation ceremony was ignored by the politicians of 
the Ministry of the Interior, the Saxonian regional government as well as the 
magistrate of Leipzig.28  
Leipzig University, that was designated to supervise the IAT institutionally, 
refused to cooperate. The governor of the university Gerald Leutert criticized, 
that there are “people in the West who seek to win medals regardless of who 
their partners are!” – with this remark he referred to the many “informal col-
laborators” of the Ministry of State Security inside the new “IAT”.29 Today 
IAT and Kreischa have stepped out of the long shadow of their past – what 
remains is the fact that these institutions, which can be characterized in the 
words of a journalist as “GDR Sport minus ideology minus doping”30 are now 
serving very well the ends of West German competitive sports. So at last, uni-
fication brought a fruitful innovation to the West German sports system. 
Another debate focused on the preservation of the so called “Kinder und 
Jugend-Sportschulen” (children’s and young people’s schools) that had been a 
reliable talent hotbed for the GDR sports system. When after the fall of the wall 
the oppressive sides of these schools became obvious, the public authorities 
flinched from integrating them into the West German education system. But 
after the disappointing performance of the West German team at the Olympics 
of Sydney 2000, the now president of the “Deutsche Olympische Sportbund” 
(DOSB) Dr. Thomas Bach, then-vice-president of the IOC, openly admitted: 
                                                             
26  This procedure was admitted by the head of the Kreischa laboratory, Dr. Claus Clausnitzer. 
“So wurde die negative Probe garantiert”. Die Welt, 4.12.1990. 
27  “Wir wollten doch keine Waschanstalt für mit Doping vollgepumpte Athleten überneh-
men”. Frankfurter Rundschau, 8.12.1990. 
28  “Sport zeigt Flagge”. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13.3.1992. 
29  “In der Medaillenforschung ist die Vergangenheit unvollkommen bewältigt”. FAZ, 
14.3.1992. 
30  Berliner Zeitung, 22.8.1996. 
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The enormous effects of the training inside the children’s and young people’s 
schools have been neglected far too long. A modified version of this East 
German schools will be the necessary precondition for the promoting of our 
future talents.31  
So these schools are enjoying a renaissance today: called “elite sports schools” 
and financed by the fund “Sports and Economy”, 21 one of them are situated in 
East Germany and five of them in Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and 
Baden-Wuerrtemberg.32 Wolfgang Tiefensee, the former mayor of Leipzig and 
one of the chief promoters of the idea of bringing the Olympics to Leipzig in 
2012, is one of the most prominent mediators between the GDR past and the 
needs of today’s sports policy. He interprets the come-back of the sport schools 
as an example of successfully coming to terms with the past:  
The sports schools have been preserved and they now are the fundament for 
our future Olympic champions. Doping, Stasi,33 elite schools – this must not 
be forgotten or hidden away. But I claim that we are succeeding in (…) de-
monstrating to the IOC how one can handle transparently this delicate and dif-
ficult issue. How you can overcome a dictatorship while walking on familiar 
grounds, with your head up high, without losing your face. 
As the Olympics in Athens in 2004 have shown, the elite schools have 
proven to be solid and successful training facilities for a new generation of top 
athletes.34 So as a matter of fact it is East German knowledge and methodology 
that is pushing forward the sporty success of the FRG.35 
Shadows of the “Golden Kids” 
In May 2006 a discussion aired on TV focused on the question if ice skater and 
coach Ingo Steuer,36 who had been an “informal collaborator” of the Stasi, 
could be a suitable person training the national Olympic team. After a while, 
Wolfgang Leonhard, one of the fiercest veteran critics of communism, asked in 
a snotty voice why he had to discuss the fate “of an ice skater”, people should 
rather concentrate on the “real gruesome crimes” of communism.37 This remark 
is the typical expression of an attitude – shared by the public and many histori-
ans – that sports and its related phenomena do not belong to the serious sub-
jects of life, let alone issues of historical research. The lack of attendance for 
sports history simply ignores the fact that sports has always been an essential 
                                                             
31  Knecht (2001, p. 451). 
32  Deutsches Olympisches Institut (1999). 
33  Synonym for Ministry of State Security. 
34  60% of the medals won at Athens were gained by alumni of these schools. “Suche nach 
dem Optimum”. Berliner Zeitung, 9.9.2004. 
35  Knecht (2001). 
36   The case of Ingo Steuer is examined by Fischer-Solms (2006). 
37  “Die Schatten der Stasi”. ARD, 9.5.2006, 22.45 Uhr.  
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part of the self-conception of dictatorships.38 The sports system of the GDR 
was not only highly subsidized by state and party, but also a focal point of 
dictatorial intervention: The Ministry of State Security spied on the sportsmen 
and women, invaded their privacy and recruited them as ”unofficial collabora-
tors” so that they could keep their sports colleagues under observation. The 
athletes had little or no chance to escape the doping programme forced on them 
by the state. Even today, many sportsmen and women are still suffering from 
the long-term damage caused by this pharmacological abuse.39  
After the merge of the sport organizations a lot of former “informal collabo-
rators” of the Ministry of State Security entered the national sport committees 
of the joint NOK and DSB. This was partly due to the fact that one year after 
the fall of the wall the knowledge concerning personal guilt was limited. West 
German officials had to rely on the hearsay when cooperating with their East-
ern counterparts. Today it sounds adventurous how Hans Hansen sent out emis-
saries to the “Wilde East” – for example Wernigerode in Thuringia – to inter-
view the East German populace about the character of the then-head of the 
GDR sports mass organisation, the “Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund” (DTSB),  
Martin Kilian.40 But this inquiry was by no means characteristic. As it seems 
West German officials mostly did not really want to get into all the compromis-
ing details from the past of their East German “Sportsfreunde” – as there was a 
strong feeling of solidarity these days, pure joy of becoming one sports nation 
again, and of course the West Germans did not want to act the big shot.  
When first there was a lack of valid information, this is no longer true since 
the files of the Ministry of State Security are open to everyone today. But 
nowadays, the sports organizations simply fail to confront themselves with the 
more inconvenient facts of the past. Only seven of the 35 Olympic national 
sports organizations voluntarily underwent a check-up by the “Birthler-
Behörde” concerning the employment of former collaborators of the MfS.41 
While the character of GDR sports as being a state-run apparatus was the pre-
condition for its close entanglement with the MfS – it is now the autonomous 
position of sports within the framework of state and society that allows its 
functionaries to decide whether or not they want to throw light on the past 
(employees of the public service do not have this freedom of choice, as they are 
automatically screened by the Birthler-Behörde.)  
The failure of the sports organizations to take appropriate responsibility for 
the considerable injustice done by the former regime has a harmful effect: the 
victims do not know whom to turn to when searching for the responsible per-
                                                             
38  The study of Schroeder on the “SED-Staat” completely ignores the issue of sports.  
Schroeder (1998). 
39  Spitzer (2005); Delow (2003). 
40  “Sonntagsreden nicht mehr gefragt”. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.12.1990. 
41  Information given by Herbert Ziehm, official of the Birthler-Behörde, at the conference 
“Große Hoffnungen – verspielte Chancen”, 12.11.2005, Universität Potsdam. 
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sons for their pain. “Was it all done by ghosts?” a sportsman asked, who lost 
his job and career after being denunciated by the MfS of having “dangerous 
contacts to the West.” The national sport organization’s unwillingness of com-
ing to terms with the past has turned out to be good for nothing: Instead of 
following the difficult but at least dignified path of self purification, the sports 
bodies are now – by there own fault – the object of an endless chain of uncov-
erings by the press, with some journalists very pleasurably quoting from per-
sonal dossiers inside the MfS files. Sensation has taken the place of an objec-
tive and intellectual debate. As there is still so much turmoil concerning the 
past, the recent amendment of the “Stasiunterlagengesetz”, the law concerning 
the accessibility of the MfS files, has explicitly allowed to check prominent 
sport functionaries with respect to their former relationship to the MfS.42 
Another crucial point of the GDR past is the doping programme forced upon 
athletes.43 Recently some East German athletes asked for deleting their “poi-
soned records” out of the national champions’ lists. But the sport organizations 
are very reluctant to meet these requests.44 At last there has been a half-hearted 
compromise: the name of the athlete is replaced by a little star, while the 
(doped) record is still registered in the sports annals.45  
While sports leaders like Manfred Ewald and Manfred Höppner were con-
victed for their share of responsibility in the “processes at Berlin Moabit” in 
2000/2001, it took until Christmas time of 2006 before an amid settlement 
between the DOSB and the victims of the forced doping programme was found 
concerning compensation.46  
What is the difference between those athletes severely damaged by pharma-
cological abuse and other categories of “victims of the SED-regime”? 
When the wall came down and the victims of the regime could make them-
selves heard publicly for the first time, it was of course not the athletes that 
arose immediate attention. Politically and religiously oppressed people, victims 
of the disappropriation policy, parents that had been separated from their chil-
dren for political reasons and many others spoke out on their sad life of suffer-
ing for the first time. Most of them had, because of an intellectual decision or a 
shocking experience, at one point or another in their lives turned into oppo-
nents of the regime. 
On the contrary, the GDR top athletes had been well integrated, even privi-
leged elements of the political system, partly they even had contributed to raise 
its international reputation. So at first glance for many people it was not easy to 
understand how a person acting conformable and supporting nevertheless is to 
                                                             
42  “Stasi-Unterlagen: Kein Schlussstrich Gesetz”. Tagesspiegel, 30.11.2006. 
43  Knecht (2002, p. 106).  
44  “Von der vergifteten Sportgeschichte befreien”. FAZ, 13.4.2006.  
45  “Ein einsames Sternchen”. taz, 8.5.2006. 
46  On this subject see the article of Michael Barsuhn in this issue. “Jenapharm entschädigt 
Dopingopfer”. Tagesspiegel, 22.12.2006. 
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be regarded as a victim of the regime – the case of GDR athletes, as Hockerts 
put it, is irritating the usual “dichotomy of the culprit and the victim”.47 
There are further factors that hampered the recognition of doped athletes as 
being victims the GDR dictatorship. It took very long, almost ten years, until 
the system of the forced doping programme was historically analysed; the 
physically damaged athletes also very late decided to form a representation of 
interest while other SED-victims for long had formed their lobbies.48 Further-
more, the physical damage for the most part could be diagnosed only years 
after unification.49 The national sport organizations showed little or no interest 
to start a dialogue with the doping victims. At last the victims themselves fre-
quently lacked the willingness and courage to step forward and express their 
concern. This reluctance is due to the fact that the milieu of former protagonists 
of GDR Sport still defames such persons as “traitors” who dare to publicly talk 
about the “secrets of GDR-Sports”. Medal winning swimmer Jörg Hoffmann 
from Potsdam, who after seven years of doubts at last conceded the drug usage, 
explained: “Those who talked about this were treated like turncoats at once.” 
The anti-doping-activist Dr. Werner Franke sees “shame” as well as “fearing 
the anger of former sports comrades” as the decisive corner stones in the wall 
of silence.50 Clearly, the mentality formed by the “state secret” named GDR 
sports has not yet loosened its grip on the persons concerned.  
Dynamo – A case of “Damnatio Memoriae” 
With the crumbling of the GDR sports system after 1989 East German sports 
clubs had to face troubled times: gone were the substantial financial funds 
supplied by the state, gone were many sport stars who preferred the exodus into 
the golden West. 
The clubs of the former sports union Dynamo that had been sponsored by 
the Ministry of State Security, were facing an ambiguous heritage: The Berlin 
football club BFC Dynamo on the one hand could proudly look back on hold-
ing the championship from 1979 up to 1988. On the other hand it had the nega-
tive reputation of being a financially pampered “Stasi club”, privileged by its 
greatest fan, the head of Dynamo and Minister of State Security Erich Mielke.  
Above all, the BFC was suspected of manipulating the results of matches by 
bribing the referees. Not only the fans of other clubs kept on complaining about 
                                                             
47  See Hockerts (2002, p. 64f.).  
48  The “Doping-Opfer-Hilfeverein e.V.” was founded in 1999. 
49  Spitzer (1998). 
50  “Es stresst mich einfach, immer zu lügen.” Berliner Zeitung, 16.10.1997; “Einigung mit 
Jenapharm”. Berliner Zeitung, 18.12.2006. 
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the swindle, even the central committee of the SED discussed the problem.51 In 
face of that image the BFC quickly tried to get rid of all symbols of the past 
after the fall of the wall. The club was in 1990 renamed in “FC Berlin”. Yet the 
club never could repeat its success and got stuck in the regional league. But in 
1999 there was a change of mind: the officials decided that taking the emer-
gency exit out of the club’s history perhaps had been a bit overhasty – and so 
the old name Dynamo was adopted again. 125 out of 135 possible votes fol-
lowed this decision, there was cheering in the club house when the result was 
announced. Jürgen Bogs, a former coach, commented: “We did achieve a lot 
back then and should stick to this tradition.”52 But a new discussion about the 
club’s controversial past was just around the corner: It started when in 2005 
Dynamo requested to decorate its jerseys with three stars – an honour reserved 
for those clubs who held a perennial championship. Up to then only the FC 
Bayern München was granted the privilege of wearing the stars. But the Ger-
man Football League refused Dynamo’s demand, arguing that only champion-
ships after the introduction of the “Bundesliga” would count – a decision that 
excluded not only the West German champions prior to 1963 but also all East 
German champions. Although the League tried to assure the public that there 
had been no “political considerations”, an immediate storm of protest by East 
German fans moaned about a severe case of deception of the “East German 
people”.53 Even the press speculated that the crucial but not openly discussed 
point in the whole “Star Wars” affair had been the question if championships 
“gained with the assistance of the Ministry of State Security should be re-
warded at all.”54  
The ice-hockey team of SC Dynamo Berlin was facing similar identity prob-
lems after 1989/90. Fifteen times the SC had been the GDR champion – al-
though this was due to a scurrility of GDR sports history. After the SED had 
decided to concentrate on the promotion of only certain kinds of sports in 
1969,55 nearly all ice-hockey teams were regarded as superfluous and were 
dissoluted. Only the SC Dynamo Berlin and the SG Dynamo Weißwasser were 
granted their existence – until 1989 the two clubs were doomed to play against 
each other in the “smallest league of the world” to please ice-hockey fan Erich 
Mielke. Each year one of them was the lucky champion – while the other auto-
matically carried the red lantern – a Kafkaesk scenario.  
                                                             
51  Vgl. Zusammenstellung von Informationen zur Problematik der Schiedsrichterleistungen 
und -verhaltensweisen im Zusammenhang mit den Spielen des BFC Dynamo, der SG  
Dynamo Dresden und dem 1. FC LOK Leipzig in der Saison 1983/84. SAPMO DY 30 IV 
2/2.039/251, 88-92. The national football organization warned that the “hatred against the 
BFC is visibly growing”. Ibid, 92. See Braun; Teichler (2003, pp. 573ff.). 
52  “BFC Dynamo wiedergeboren”. Berliner Zeitung, 4.5.1999. 
53  “Griff nach den Sternen”. Berliner Zeitung, 7.4.2005. 
54  “Kringel oder Bälle”. Berliner Zeitung, 7.4.2005. 
55   Teichler; Reinartz (1999, pp. 55-79). 
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After 1989 the SC Dynamo like the BFC seeked a short escape route out of 
history; the club was renamed into “Berlin polar bears”. The president Helmut 
Berg declared Dynamo a “faux-pas-word”, old photos, insignias and banners 
were accounted for as taboo and hidden away in the closet, fans wearing old 
Dynamo jerseys were refused to enter the stadium. Only when the new Cana-
dian coach Pierre Pagé arrived in 2002, a revival of the club history was al-
lowed. His German co-Trainer Hartmut Nickel showed relief about the Cana-
dian laissez-faire: “We would not have dared to do so on our own. Everybody 
would have called us the unconvincible adherers of nostalgia who above all 
love marching around the stadium while carrying red banners.”56  
Today the old jerseys are produced again for the young fans, the team quar-
ters are again decorated with medals and knick-knack of the 1960s and 1970, 
on the wall the Dynamo emblem is hanging side by side to the “polar bear 
head”, the new icon. The very popular East German band “Puhdys” has re-
corded the club’s anthem – an evidence of the club’s deliberate cultivation of 
an East German identity. So at last, after a short period of “damnatio memo-
riae” both clubs returned to their Dynamo roots – even if that means to put up 
with discrimination. Nine year old kids training on the Dynamo premises are 
not seldom verbally harassed as “Stasi Kids”57 
Rivaling memories 
“Very nice, the enemies are gone,”58 the president of the West German NOK 
Willi Daume shouted in November 1990 in view of the fact that the front lines 
of the Cold War simply had vanished and a German unity in sport was immi-
nent. It nearly seemed a little weird and spooky how the East German NOK, 
who over decades had struggled with its West German pendant in the fields of 
prestige, medals and ideology, gathered for its “last dance” on 17th November 
1990. At this meeting, the dissolution of the NOK was declared, the organiza-
tion quietly stole away from the stages of sports as well as politics.59  
But as this article has pointed out, East German Sports, its achievements and 
advantages as well as its sometimes brutal methods are still a matter of heated 
debate in contemporary Germany. There a several conflicting images: At one 
moment GDR sports appears to be a bright promising institutional model for 
the future, while the next moment people get a glance at the severe injustice 
and harm inflicted in the name of it. GDR sports is being remembered in very 
different ways by very distinct social groups and agencies. First there are the 
                                                             
56  “Unter weinroten Fahnen”. Berliner Zeitung, 19.4.2005. 
57  Information of the president of the BFC Dynamo, Mario Weinkauf at a conference in 
Berlin, 28.6.2006.  
58  “Wie schön, die Feinde sind verschwunden”. Deutsches Sportecho, 19.11.1990. 
59  “Das NOK der DDR nimmt still Abschied”. FAZ, 19.11.1990. 
 183
officials of the regional sports administrations in East Germany, who 17 years 
ago have been officials of the DTSB. They often have a clear positive picture 
of the past. When celebrating the 15th birthday of the “Landessportbund Bran-
denburg” in September 2005, the people attending the meeting in Potsdam 
were in fact celebrating the “happy times back in the GDR” and the merits of 
the DTSB. On the contrary, state-sponsored institutions like the Birthler-
Behörde and the “Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur” use to focus 
mainly on the issue of repression. Since the 1990s various historical studies 
have been published that cover a wide range of topics like serious sports, dop-
ing, but also every day sports and aspects of the social life of the athletes. This 
analytical approach is countered by former protagonists of GDR sports, who 
hold up high the remembrance of a “flourishing sporty landscape” now and 
forever gone.60 One can only guess which of the voices in this dissonant choir 
will be the loudest, when the calendar sheets will mark the 50th birthday of the 
DTSB in April 2007. One thing can be taken for sure: While members of the 
one party will grasp the opportunity to enter the podiums and remind the audi-
ence of the inhuman aspects of a dictatorial and centralized sports system; the 
others will think of the age of success back in the “Sportwunderland GDR”.  
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